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ACTIVISM, BIOETHICS AND ACADEMIC RESEARCH
ABSTRACT
This paper sketches a taxonomy of the activities in which bioethics academics engage, 
including activities that may make their own research more impactful, from little or no 
engagement outside academia to activism or extreme activism. This taxonomy, the first of 
its kind, may be useful in determining what obligations bioethics academics have in relation 
to activism and activities that fall-short of activism. 
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One question that motivated this collection was whether engaging in activism is, or indeed 
ought to be, an obligation that arises out of bioethics as an academic activity. There is, 
however, a prior question that will be addressed in this paper; namely what counts as 
activism associated with academic bioethics, as distinct from other activities that fall short 
of activism, but which may be part of an academic’s role. In particular, public engagement 
and ‘impact’ are increasingly being associated with academic research, but in different ways 
and for different reasons. Two examples are the so-call ‘impact agenda’ in the UK and 
‘Impact Ethics’ as conceived by the team in Dalhousie University, Canada. Each will now be 
briefly outlined and discussed as a starting point for considering the relationship between 
bioethics research and activism, and activities that fall short of activism.
Academic research in the UK has been shaped by a national initiative aimed at measuring 
and assessing research output every eight years. This process is thought to drive excellence 
in research.1 The current iteration is called the Research Excellence Framework (REF). Of 
increasing significance to the REF is ‘impact’: the effects of research outside academia. This 
is demonstrated by ‘impact case studies’ (ICS) outlining specific beneficial effects of 
published research. Successful ICSs demonstrate a direct link between published research 
and its impact. In addition, funders of research expect applicants to demonstrate that they 
will maximise the impact of their results, and a key component of many research 
applications is a ‘pathways to impact’ document (or statement) that describes the activities 
1 It is modelled on scientific and clinical research, but applied to all kinds of research 
including humanities.
































































that researchers will undertake to achieve this. Running alongside REF and funder 
preoccupations with impact is the requirement for patient public involvement (PPI), 
particularly – but not exclusively – in clinical research. This encourages researchers to work 
with stakeholders to identify research priorities, define research goals and outcome 
measures, design acceptable research methods and so on. All of these kinds of initiatives 
are intended to ensure that academic research delivers excellence, relevance and value for 
money as judged not just by their peers but different publics/stakeholders. This is one 
understanding of ‘impactful’ research. 
Another perspective on impact can be found in the work of the Impact Ethics research team 
based in Dalhousie University, Canada. Impact Ethics is described as
using the tools of ethics to shock, press, crack, and chip society into a better place. It 
is about outcomes and ordering the study of ethics around changing things for the 
better.2
This requires challenging the status quo of both health care and professional bioethics, 
putting science to work for human good and making human institutions more accountable, 
transparent and just. Bioethics is called upon to be ‘innovative, responsible and 
accountable’, and Impact Ethics described as challenging individual professional bioethics 
2 Impact Ethics home page https://impactethics.ca/about/ [Accessed 28 November 2018].
































































academics to ‘re–examine their values and bias and to be transparent about goals, priorities 
and conflicts of interest’.3
These two accounts of impact and focussing research on what matters beyond academia are 
not necessarily incompatible. Arguably both are intended to promote human good. The 
latter, however, captures a sense that bioethics as a discipline4 has, and therefore that 
academics working in bioethics have, a particular obligation to instigate change. This 
suggests a potentially seamless relationship between bioethics as an academic subject and 
activities that will bring about change. For some bioethics researchers, the shift to greater 
stakeholder engagement and impact has merely required formalising, perfecting and 
making explicit existing research practices. Indeed, the impact agenda in the UK may even 
3 About Impact Ethics https://www.dal.ca/sites/noveltechethics/about.html [Accessed 28 
November 2018].
4 I do not wish to get distracted here by what bioethics is and is not. I have written about 
this elsewhere: “bioethics is a discipline in its own right: it is a community of scholars, with 
its own journals, conferences, networks and ways of approaching and debating moral 
problems and issues in the area of the life sciences. This community includes others from 
disciplines such as medical law, medicine and sociology who contribute to this specific 
community of practice. However, for it to be ethics, it has to keep as a central element the 
elucidation of normative claims and corresponding analytical strategies.” (L. Frith & H. 
Draper. 2017. Publishing Research in Empirical Bioethics: Quality, Disciplines and Expertise. 
In Empirical Bioethics: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives J. Ives, M. Dunne & A. Cribb, 
eds. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press: 235–255 p.239.)  
































































be regarded as sanctioning activities (including activism) that had previously only been 
perceived as at best borderline work– or discipline–related. 
But this is not a view of the relationship shared by all. Ideological objections have been 
raised, not perhaps so much to the drive for research excellence, but to working so closely 
with stakeholders. Distance, detachment and remaining dispassionate are valuable and, for 
some, possibly even defining, dimensions of open–minded academic enterprise.
Once a philosopher abandons her academic detachment and jumps headlong into a 
particular case or controversy, she sacrifices the unique and valuable perspective of 
one who seeks primarily to understand a problem, rather than to fix it.5 
David Benatar is also cautious about ‘[a]ctivism in (rather than as a consequence of) an 
academic field’,6 because activism rallies to a specific agenda that entails commitment to a 
particular set of values and outcomes. Regardless of whether one agrees with Benatar that 
‘[t]he primary purpose of academic work is to enlighten’, that prior commitment may 
5 M.M. Dempsey, & M. Lister. 2016. Applied Political and Legal Philosophy. In K. Lippert-
Rasmussen, K. Brownlee, & D. Coady, eds. A Companion to Applied Philosophy. New Jersey: 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 313–327 p.319.
6 D. Benatar. Bioethics and Health and Human Rights: A Critical View. Journal of Medical 
Ethics. 2006; 32(1), 17–20, p.19.
































































potentially hinder robust research is a fair concern.7 His distinction between activism ‘in’ or 
‘as a consequence of’ is also a useful for considering different ways in which activism and 
research can interact. 
Against this back ground, this paper aims to describe the different ways in which bioethics 
academics may respond the calls for greater public engagement, as academics. I will sketch 
a taxonomy of impact or engagement activities for academic bioethics that ranges from 
little or no engagement beyond academia, as a matter of principle, to activities that can be 
described as activism. In between these lies a range of activities that fall short of activism 
and may be quite differently motivated – like impact activities in fulfilment of the UK REF 
requirement. Creating a nuanced typology of differently intended and motivated bioethics 
engagement might be useful for thinking about questions such as whether (or when) 
academics working in the field ought to be prepared to engaged with, or be pro–active in 
bringing about, that which their academic research suggests would improve the human 
condition, or human behaviours or institutions. What I am proposing is only a taxonomy; I 
am not supposing, for instance, that the closer an activity sits to activism the better it is.
Next, I will establish how the terms ‘activism’ / ‘activist’ will be used in this paper from here 
on in. 
7 Once people have firm beliefs these can be difficult to shake. See for example, J. Kaplan, 
S.I. Gimel & S. Harris. Neural Correlates of Maintaining One’s Political Beliefs in the Face of 
Counter-evidence. Scientific Reports. 2016; 6 (39589) doi: 10.1038/srep39589.
































































2. ACTIVISM, EXTREME ACTIVISM AND (PURE) APPLIED ETHICS: OPPOSITE POLES ON A 
CONTINUUM 
Dempsey and Lister8 describe three approaches – Standard Activist, Extreme Activist and 
Conceptual Activist. Their distinctions are useful when thinking about how academic effort 
might be focussed, but the terminology is misleading. For example, Dempsey and Lister say 
that the Standard Activist ‘takes no direct causal role’ in bringing about change. Rather:
 
[t]he philosopher presents an argument, directed primarily to other philosophers, 
defending or critiquing some policy or set of policies. If policy makers happen to come 
across the argument, are persuaded by it, and then manage to secure the 
philosopher’s desired outcome, so much the better, from the philosopher’s point of 
view.9 
Whereas, ‘in extreme activism…the philosopher acts as an expert consultant and presents 
an argument direct to policy makers.’10 
When thinking about activism as ordinarily understood, these descriptions are overly 
passive and all–inclusive (in the case of standard activism), and overly tame (in the case of 
extreme activism). Activism, as ordinarily understood, is far from passive. Activism requires 
8 Dempsey and Lister,  op. cit. note 5. 
9 Ibid: 314.
10 Ibid: 315.
































































vigorous, concerted effort; it is ‘taking direct action’. As Benatar intimates, activism is 
partisan, by which I mean that activism is ‘prejudiced in favour of a particular cause’ (the 
Oxford English Dictionary definition of the adjective ‘partisan’). Activism is political, usually 
conducted publically and thereby, prior to the internet at least,11 entails aligning oneself 
personally, as an identifiable individual with a particular cause and its agenda for change. 
Activists are motivated to effect social change by what they see as the strength of the cause 
(their partisan commitment) and this motivation, together with sustained and vigorous 
personal effort, distinguishes activism from, for example, mere virtue signalling. Activism 
tends to be associated with effort directed at bringing about a wholesale change. This is 
reflects the view that many social problems are spawned by an endemic, underlying 
injustice such as wealth, race, gender or even species inequalities. Against this backdrop, 
11 There is now considerable scope for activism in online spaces. Here it is much easier for 
individuals to operate using pseudonyms. In some cases, this may be an attempt to 
protecting or even hide one’s identity. However, in other cases individuals might have a 
distinct and important–to–them online identity, which may be as vulnerable to hostile 
criticism (for example, for inconsistency or for voicing views about which others disagree) as 
are individuals who are not using pseudonyms. Thus, whilst it may be argued that being 
identifiable is not a necessary criterion for activism, what does matter is that one is seen to 
be presenting views one holds (or views that are held by the individual represented by the 
pseudonym) rather than arguments that might be made in the abstract. The use of 
pseudonyms and anonymity in activism is a moot point – see for instance T. Sorell. Human 
Rights and Hacktivism: the cases of Wikileaks and Anonymous. Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 2015; 7(3): 391–410.
































































small changes in policy might be regarded as mere window dressing. As suggested by the 
Dalhousie definition, however, big problems can be chipped away at. Small changes, for 
example in a local or national policy improving treatment delivery or how a new technology 
is (or is not) incorporated into a care system, may fall short of addressing underlying 
injustices but still make things somewhat better than they were. Given that this paper is 
discussing activism and academic bioethics, for the purposes of this paper, whether or not 
an activity will be regarded as activism will be measured by the persistence and vigour of 
the individual’s efforts to secure change in areas associated with their academic research, 
rather than the scale of the issue being tackled or whether the intended results are 
achieved. 
 Contrary to Dempsey and Lister, in this paper extreme activism will be defined according to 
the effort devoted or means used in activism. For instance, devoting most, if not all, of one’s 
time and resources to a cause (which is likely to be incompatible with academic duties). Or 
resorting to non-peaceful, aggressive or potentially illegal, methods (such as arson, raids, 
covert surveillance, ‘outing’ and so on). Or it may refer to sacrificing personal safety, such as 
maintaining peaceful protest in the face of violent state response (as occurred on Ghandi’s 
Salt March, for instance, or lying in the path of a lorry transporting livestock for slaughter 
abroad). Activities that Dempsey and Lister describe as extreme, such as presenting 
arguments to policy–makers and acting as an ethics consultant might be forms of ordinary, 
non-extreme activism, as we shall see. 
































































Thus, when thinking about bioethics, research and activism, we may be in fact be thinking of 
a range of different forms of engagement. Extreme activism, as defined above, lies at one 
end of the spectrum, with pure philosophy (as we shall now see) marking the other end. 
 
Pure philosophy and applied ethics (according to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s12 
characterisation of these) and ‘standard activism’ (according to Dempsey and Lister13) are 
on the same spectrum as activism (as I define it), because both include some measure of 
engagement. They are remote on the spectrum from activism because they are not 
necessarily meant to bring about change in the world outside academia. Applied ethics is, 
however, supposed to be of relevance to the world, in that it considers human behaviour 
and suggests changes in it for the better: it is closer to activism than pure philosophy, but 
still remote from activism. 
Engagement in terms of publishing and exposing one’s findings/arguments to the scrutiny of 
others (one’s peers at the very least) is entirely compatible with bioethics. We might also 
suppose that all those who claim to be publishing academic research have an obligation to 
do so with honesty and integrity. At the very least, this means not plagiarising the work of 
others, not falsifying data and fairly acknowledging the contributions others have made to 
their work. As researchers, we should also acknowledge any limitations of our arguments, 
12 K. Lippert-Rasmussen. 2016. The Nature of Applied Philosophy. In K. Lippert-Rasmussen, 
K. Brownlee, & D. Coady, eds. A Companion to Applied Philosophy. New Jersey: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc.: 3–47.
13 Dempsey and Lister op. cit. note 5. 
































































which includes acknowledging, for example, known counter–examples that may weaken 
them. Some have gone further and suggested that we should also declare any potential 
biases we may have in a process of reflexivity similar to that employed in the social 
sciences.14 Even if one is not willing to go this far, some direct consideration of potential 
non–specialist audiences may be prudent as well as helpful to those unfamiliar to the 
conventions of philosophical writing. Whilst more theoretical applied ethics should have 
relevance to the world outside academia, this relevance might not be immediately apparent 
to non-philosophers. Thought experiments, for example, are not meant to be taken literally, 
despite appearances to the contrary.15 Philosophers such as Jonathan Glover,16 who have 
helped to popularise applied ethics by writing in plain English for non–specialists, should 
14 J. Ives & M. Dunn. Who's arguing?: A Call for Reflexivity in Bioethics. Bioethics 2010; 24: 
256–65.
15 A. Giubilini & F. Minerva. After Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live? Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 2012; 39; 261–263. This paper attracted considerable and sometimes very 
hostile public attention (including death threats) and resulted in the authors publishing an 
open letter (http://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2012/03/02/an-open-letter-from-
giubilini-and-minerva/ [Accessed 5 March 2018]) explaining the nature and intended 
audience of their paper.
16 For example, Glover’s book Causing death and saving lives, which was published by 
Penguin Books (a popular, non-academic publishing house) in 1977. More recently, TED 
Talks and blogs have served a similar purpose. See also note 17 below re choosing to publish 
in specialist non-bioethics journals (e.g. technology, scientific and medical journals).
































































also be regarded as engaging with the public as well as their peers, and have done so 
without (necessarily) being activists. 
When thinking about the relationship between bioethics research and activism, however, 
we perhaps also need to give some thought to whether those who are working at the non–
activism end of the spectrum are also supposed to feel personally bound by the force of 
their own published arguments. For example, if an academic argues strongly against the 
exploitation of animals in farming or about the unreasonable environmental costs of eating 
meat, shouldn’t we expect them to be personally committed to veganism? This may depend 
on the nuances of the argument proposed, but let us confine ourselves here to the thought 
that as bioethics researchers we should not be hypocrites: we should at least strive to adopt 
the principles and practices we publically espouse. Insofar as our work overlaps with it, we 
should at least take direct and sustained action to change/maintain (as appropriate) our 
own behaviour even if we do not feel moved actively to influence that of others.
In this section I have suggested that theoretical or pure applied ethics does have a place on 
a taxonomy of engagement that places activism in general, and extreme activism in 
particular, at the opposite end. I will now explore some forms of engagement that sit 
between these two poles. On the whole, I have tried to work across from the more 
theoretical end of the spectrum towards its activism end. The whole taxonomy is 
represented in figure 1 in the conclusion to the paper.
3. BEING CONSULTED VERSES BEING AN ETHICS CONSULTANT
































































In their analysis, Dempsey and Lister run together (as examples of ‘extreme activism’ in their 
account) giving evidence in court as an expert witness and working as a clinical ethics 
consultant. In a more nuanced account, these may be regarded as quite distinct activities. 
Accepting an invitation to provide an expert opinion, based on one’s academic publications, 
for a public forum like a court, or in some policy arena, falls far short of activism as defined 
above. But it is clearly engaging with a wider audience than one’s fellow specialists.17 
Addressing a public forum as an identifiable individual meets one element of activism (as I 
have defined it), and may leave one personally open to public scrutiny or criticism in return. 
Accepting an invitation is, however, too passive to count as activism: such invitations may 
be issued only rarely or only rarely accepted. Similarly, accepting an invitation issued to 
17 It should also be noted that some bioethics researchers deliberately publish in places 
where they are able to engage directly with practitioners who are not fellow bioethics 
academics, for instance, in specialist engineering, science, technology or medical journals. 
This is another way of popularising applied ethics research that goes a step further than the 
plain English accounts mentioned in section 2. This might be regarded as becoming 
embedded with the audiences one seeks to influence. It increases the chances of one’s work 
influencing practice, and therefore increases the prospects of some tangible impact. It is not 
an entirely cost-free decision, however. Publishing in specialist technology journals may 
mean that one’s work is less well regarded by, e.g. more philosophical colleagues in the UK 
making decisions about what to include in a philosophy REF return. It also means adapting 
to different publishing norms. One of these may be much lower word limits (these can be as 
low as 1,500 words in some medical journals). Another is a different view about the status 
of conference papers; computer scientists and engineers regard some published conference 
































































speak for a position one’s academic writing in any case supports, falls short of being 
partisan. Moreover, agreeing to give expert evidence in the context of court proceedings in 
a growing number of jurisdictions, requires one explicitly not to be partisan.18 For example, 
section 35.3 of the UK Ministry of Justice Civil Procedures Rules states:
(1) It is the duty of experts to help the court [my emphasis] on matters within their 
expertise.
(2) This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom experts have received 
instructions or by whom they are paid.19
These duties are echoed in Section 19.2 (1) (a) of the Criminal Procedures Rules which also 
obliges experts to be ‘objective and unbiased’.20 The reasons for accepting an invitation to 
provide an expert opinion may likewise not align with activism: one may accept solely or 
primarily to enhance one’s reputation or improve one’s CV. Soliciting as many invitations as 
possible to speak at such fora, or seeking a position on a committee in order to influence 
papers more highly than papers published in conventional journals, and rank conferences 
for impact and prestige in the same way that other disciplines rank journals.  
18 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this point.
19 Ministry of Justice Civil Procedures Rules https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/rules/part35#IDASLICC [Accessed 27 November 2018].
20 Ministry of Justice Criminal Procedures Rules 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal/docs/2015/crim-proc-rules-
2015-part-19.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2018].
































































change in a particular direction, would take one nearer to activism, and this is something 
that being a published academic in bioethics may facilitate. But there are other activities 
that fall between these kinds of action and being an invited expert, and these include some 
types of work as an ethics consultant.
There are different ways of working as an ethicist, or ethics consultant. This kind of work – 
we might even call it practice – is unlikely to be a one–off. It is likely to be work that one has 
actively sought. It may be part of the job description of an academic post one has applied 
for; or it may be an additional role that one’s employer recognises as being in harmony with 
one’s substantive post; or one may undertake the additional duties in one’s own time but 
apply using one’s academic role as collateral in one’s application. These activities can greatly 
improve one’s understanding of the context in which practical ethical decision–making takes 
place, thereby improving one’s academic work. There is an established body of literature 
exploring what it means, and does not mean, to be an ethics expert. This is suggestive of the 
kind of interactions the authors argue ethicists should have in these roles. For example, as 
David Archard put it: 
His role should not be that of invoking his expertise to ensure that what is done 
follows from his own [my emphasis] better moral judgement of what should be done. 
Rather it ought to be that of advising and ‘coaching’ non-philosophers, ensuring that 
they may come to see why better judgement is a better judgement.21
21 D. Archard. Why Moral Philosophers are not and should not be Moral Experts.’ Bioethics 
2011: 29(3); 119–127.
































































This kind of model accords with seeing the primary goal of academic work being to 
enlighten but adds an element of facilitation to the process. This is not something that 
occurs in the abstract, but is rather aimed at problem–solving of an immediate practical or 
policy kind. As Sherwin and Baylis22 imply, however, one can mediate or facilitate in a 
manner that accords with a particular set of ideals (in their case feminist) without trying to 
influence the actual decision that needs to be made. If one is active in bringing about 
change in the process and decision–making environment rather than the outcome, one is 
what they describe as a ‘consultant–architect’. Moreover, Sherwin and Baylis envisage the 
possibility of this form of engagement leading to outcomes in the form of patient choices 
that are contrary to those the ethicist would like to see, but accepts nonetheless. 
[She] may deeply regret these decisions and work hard to make certain that the 
patient understands the social implications of her choice: she may identify and bring 
to the discussion alternative actions that might be acceptable to the patient. She 
would certainly try to the best of her ability to counter coercive forces … Ultimately, 
however, in most cases, the clinical ethics consultant must accept the patient’s 
informed decision.23
22 S. Sherwin & F. Baylis. The Feminist Health Care Ethics Consultant as Architect and 
Advocate. Public Affairs Quarterly. 2003: 17(2); 141–158.
23 Ibid : 153.
































































As Sherwin and Baylis describe the feminist clinical ethics consultant–architect, she is very 
active in the background ensuring to the best of her ability that power imbalances and 
gender oppression do not impede decision–making. It is not necessarily the case that either 
the academic invited to give evidence or the advising and coaching philosopher is indifferent 
to these sorts of concerns. But it is also not necessary for their chosen role that they are 
concerned about them, and what is more, actively working to address them. Thus, Sherwin 
and Baylis’ model of ethics consultant as architect would seem to be nearer the activism 
end of the spectrum than a facilitating mediator or philosopher–coach model is.
Two further observations can be made about the ethics consultant–architect model. The 
first is that the context in which the role is located by Sherwin and Baylis lends itself to not 
interfering in a decision with which one disagrees. They are envisaging a clinical ethicist 
bringing together various parties in a clinical setting, where the decision–maker is an adult 
patient with capacity to make her own decision. This fact alone – in Western cultures at any 
rate –favours accepting whatever decision is made by the patient. The outcome whatever it 
is, provided the patient decides it, is in this respect an acceptable outcome, even if it is not 
what the feminist ethics consultant hoped for. Improving the process and environment is 
the object of the action Sherwin and Baylis describe, rather than what is decided (hence the 
‘architect’ component). There are, however, other situations where there is no single, 
obvious ‘rightful’ authority. For example, when deciding where to locate consultant–led 
maternity services, or whether to concentrate all intensive care beds in specialist urban 
centres, or whether to legalise cannabis use. Confining oneself to being facilitator when one 
































































disagrees with the decision in these circumstances is clearly more difficult.24 Here the ethics 
consultant may be tempted to bring her the skills born of her academic expertise to bear to 
persuade others to a different conclusion. Indeed, she may question the facilitator model 
because, as Singer suggests:
it would be surprising if moral philosophers were not, in general, better suited to 
arrive at the right, or soundly based, conclusions than non–philosophers. Indeed, if 
this were not the case, one would wonder whether moral philosophy was 
worthwhile.25
Whether or not the ethics consultant is right to agree with Singer, if this is her view and she 
acts on it, she will have moved a step closer to activism.
The second observation to make about Sherwin and Baylis’ feminist ethics consultant–
architect model is that its commitment to feminism is itself a commitment to a certain kind 
of political engagement and action. The same could be said of utilitarianism. In determining 
that morality requires the maximisation of benefit, utilitarianism not only chimes with non–
24 Though arguably determining what weight should be given to the various stakeholders’ 
views might also be salient, and one’s commitment to a particular theoretical method – 
feminism or utilitarianism for example – might influence one’s views about this. Moreover, 
one might have a view and also be trying to ensure that the process by which the decision is 
made is free from oppression and gender imbalance etc.
25 P. Singer. Moral Experts. Analysis 1972: 32(4); 115–117.
































































academic intuition in ways that have enabled it readily to colonise public policy (think about 
the ready acceptance of cost–benefit analysis in healthcare), but it also provides a clear 
recipe for living at a personal level. This is manifest in the movement for effective altruism,26 
which is actively promoted by high profile utilitarians and other academics. The request for 
public pledging of a proportion of one’s income to causes identified by effective altruism 
serves to identify contributors personally with the movement. In both feminism and 
utilitarianism, some form of political action in one’s personal life seems to be necessitated 
by the conclusions drawn from one’s academic work. This is one indication of the way in 
which activism and academic research may go hand–in–hand. 
The more closely one’s work in bioethics brings one into contact with stakeholders, the 
more likely one is to be drawn into actions to improve their circumstances, and the closer 
one may move to activism in research. Here it is fruitful to consider again the range of 
different action, circumstances and motivations in play.
26 P. Singer. 2015 The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas 
about Living Ethically. Yale University Press. Preface (ebook http://0-
web.a.ebscohost.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/bsi/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzk5M
Dg0MV9fQU41?sid=bf458fee-20b5-4f8d-8b23-
4172bf6f19cd@sessionmgr4008&vid=0&format=EK&lpid=n6&rid=0 ) ‘Living a minimally 
acceptable life involves using a substantial part of our spare resources to make the world a 
better place. Living a fully ethical life means involves doing the most good we can’. 
































































5. ADVOCACY AND WHISTLE-BLOWING VERSES ACTIVISM
‘Advocacy’ and ‘activism’ are sometimes used interchangeably but this runs together two 
different types of action represented by the term ‘advocate’. ‘Advocate’ can be defined as 
follows:
1. A person who publicly supports or recommends a particular cause or policy.
2. A person who puts a case on someone else's behalf.27
In order to distinguish between ‘activism’ and ‘advocacy’, in this paper I will take ‘advocate’ 
to mean ‘a person who puts a case on someone else’s behalf’, whilst accepting that 
advocacy as it is used elsewhere may have either or both meanings. 
An essential element of advocacy in this sense is that the advocate speaks not as herself but 
as someone who is authorised by those for whom she advocates to voice and defend their 
views and claims, whether or not they accorded with her own views. Legal advocates – 
criminal barristers, for example – should represent clients to the best of their ability without 
regard for what they personally think about them or the crimes that may or may not have 
been committed. Nurses are likewise expected to be their patient’s advocate, regardless of 
what they think about what the patient wants. The advocate is perceived to be better 
placed than those she represents – perhaps because of her skills, knowledge, confidence or 
position in a particular system – to ensure that their voices are amplified and not 
misunderstood. An essential component of advocacy is that it self–consciously represents 
27 Oxford English Dictionary. Available 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/advocate [Accessed 27 November 2018].
































































the views of others who have authorised the advocate to represent them. The advocate’s 
professional rather than personal persona is likely to be at the fore in these activities. 
Advocacy on this definition, is about helping individuals/groups of individuals to achieve 
their objectives, rather bringing about changes that align to one’s own beliefs.
Advocacy becomes activism when the academic moves from helping individuals or groups 
better to present their views, or to navigate systems, to aligning herself to their cause and 
voicing her own views on the issue. One may be closer to activism than advocacy if one’s 
offer to speak for an individual or group is motivated by one’s political beliefs that those 
who are often silenced or ignored should be given help to amplify their voice. Skills that 
academics develop in their professional lives may help them to be effective advocates in 
areas otherwise unrelated to their work interests.
Occasionally, bioethics academics are also engaged in (or support) whistle–blowing. This 
may be related to advocacy; having helped individuals to navigate the systems for redress 
within an organisation and failed to obtain a satisfactory response, the next step may be to 
make the complaint or issue more public. Alternatively, work that is done as a consultant to 
a specific committee (such as a research ethics review board or a clinical ethics committee) 
may bring an academic into contact with systematic malpractice that she feels compelled to 
expose (notwithstanding any explicit or implicit confidentiality agreement).  
Whistle–blowers take action to expose circumstances in the hope that others will be 
thereby be forced to bring about change. Whistle–blowers are not necessarily personally 
committed to taking things forward or being part of action for change – though blowing the 
































































whistle may be the first step on a path to more active involvement. Whistle–blowing is 
different to, for example, covert surveillance with a view to exposing bad practice. Whistle–
blowers may have tried and failed to call attention to problems or failures using in–house 
mechanisms before going public. Such pre– blowing the whistle activities may include 
stealth activism (see below). Important to where this kind of engagement lies in my 
typology, is that the whistle–blower addresses the public, as an identifiable individual, 
acting on their personal judgement. Silence becomes unconscionable. Academics may rally 
to the support of a whistle–blower by signing a petition. This too is a form of engagement, 
though one often requiring little personal effort or cost in western democracies well served 
by the internet. Here academic credentials may be used to lend force to the personal 
judgement of the whistle–blower: ‘150 professors of bioethics support the action’, as 
opposed to ‘150 concerned members of the public support the action’. Those being asked to 
sign petitions in support of whistle–blowers or other actions and causes may, therefore, 
need to consider what their own views about moral expertise are before they sign as 
Professor J. Bloggs (or other academic role/indicator), rather than as plain J. Bloggs. 
6. STEALTH ACTIVISM VERSES THE RELUCTANT MINORITY MEMBER
‘Stealth activism’ is sometimes used to describe the planting of subliminal messages that 
may be more arresting, and therefore more effective, than active confrontation. Some 
vegans use the term when, for instance, promoting vegan fast food outlets to counter the 
view that, because vegan food is boring and tasteless, adopting a vegan diet is unduly 
onerous. It has also been used to describe the placing of graphic stickers on apparently non–
meat–related food items to call attention to animal ingredients, or the placing of cuddly–toy 
































































cows, sheep and pigs etc. amongst the cuts on the meat aisle of supermarkets to remind 
customers where meat comes from.28 
It could also be used to distinguish between ways of being an activist that are more or less 
strident. Alice Dreger, who describes herself as a historian of science, activist and bioethics 
academic, describes the reactions of some intersex activists to her own brand of activism at 
the time as follows:  
Bo and I were not, after all, with the extremists on the picket line outside … I was an 
especially easy target of the identity–card–carrying activists. I was not intersex, I was 
not queer, I was not a clinician, so what was I doing there?... Some accused me of 
being a kind of mole – of being ‘in bed with the doctors.’ When people put this charge 
to my face, I asked whether they realised that being in bed with the doctors provided 
a lot more opportunities to tickle their nuts, so to speak, than simply yelling at them 
from outside the window. In fact, I admitted, I found the window–yellers useful, 
precisely because they made us look sane and reasonable.29
Or ‘stealth activism’ might be used to describe deliberately working for change, quietly or 
even covertly, from within the system. For example, putting oneself forward for committee 
28 Tofu Temptress. Stealth Activism. 2017. Available http://vegans.uk/cruelty-free-
living/stealth-activism/ [Accessed 28 November 2018].
29 A. Dreger. 2015. Galileo’s Middle Finger: Heretics, Activists and the Search for Justice in 
Science. Penguin: Chapter 1 (ebook no page numbers)
































































roles in order to quietly steer discussion in a particular direction without overtly ‘playing the 
ethics card’, or preferentially offering to mentor or supervise students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds.30
Here we might distinguish between messages that work through stealth, and using stealth 
as the means of bringing about change. Leaving the supermarket’s own soft toys in the meat 
aisle may mean that the toys have to be discounted for sale (thereby eroding the 
supermarkets profit margins) but the use of such non–graphic messages to get consumers 
to think differently about meat seems otherwise morally innocuous. Other kinds of 
subliminal messages may be more controversial for reasons that are already widely 
rehearsed in relation to nudging (coercion or manipulation, deception, lack of transparency, 
undermining personal responsibility for decision–making etc.). Fitting in to be taken 
seriously raises different issues that range from compromising personal integrity to subtle 
forms of manipulation that play on existing prejudices of, for instance, what one should look 
like and how one should behave if one expects to be taken seriously in particular social 
groups.31 What is clear from Dreger’s book, however, is that she was not a covert activist 
when it came to trying to change clinical practices and attitudes towards intersex babies and 
children. She made frequent public statements about the kinds of changes she was seeking 
30 Thanks to Professor Wendy A. Rogers for these examples.
31 Dreger op. cit. note 29, for example, describes recognising that she would need to change 
her appearance (e.g. grow out her hair, and wear pantyhose and pumps) to be taken 
seriously. 
































































and why, and publically associated herself with the cause she supported. Activism that uses 
stealth, such as working quietly from within without declaring one’s agenda, might be 
regarded as more suspect because it is covert and may therefore be regarded deceptive and 
manipulative. Or, stealth activism in the case of quiet preferential personal mentoring and 
supervision decisions, may be criticised for being both covert and preferential because the 
lack of transparency means that the preferential treatment is not open to scrutiny or 
challenge. 
There are other ways of employing stealth in activism as an academic. When working in 
areas that are highly controversial, or which are already subject to hostile activism activities, 
one may choose to work with practitioners in the field to bring about change incrementally 
from within. One might do this by genuinely engaging with the obstacles to change that 
practitioners themselves face, that they may be somewhat powerless to change on a 
whole–scale basis, and by accepting that the practitioners themselves may also be people of 
good will. For example, working with military doctors who are caught between being a 
soldier working within the chain of command on the one hand, and being a doctor working 
within the constraints of professional ethics and regulation on the other. Building 
constructive relationships of trust and confidence can be the sugar that helps the medicine 
go down. This kind of stealth activism means foregoing opportunities to be shrill or ‘right 
on’; it involves being patient with underlying flaws and necessitates playing the long game 
of waiting until such time that fundamental or systemic criticisms will not be dismissed out 
of hand.
































































The covert nature of stealth activism means that one is not personally and publically 
associated with a movement for change. This lack of public exposure may make it attractive 
to those who value their own private lives and feel uncomfortable when their professional 
and private worlds collide. Not everyone is willing to expose themselves (or their families 
and friends) to violent, verbal attacks and indiscriminate public broadcasting of aspects of 
their private lives (past and present). For those with thicker skins, financial and other types 
of security, or greater confidence (or combinations of all of these) this unwillingness may be 
viewed as cowardice. Activists, especially those with vested–interests, may rightly feel that 
they have not the time or patience to ‘play nice’ with academics who either blunder naively 
into their orbits32 or who are trying to achieve change by means of stealth. Some kinds of 
32 As academics generally publish under their own names, they may be unwittingly 
catapulted into public controversy (see note 15) and in this respect the line between their 
public and private life is already blurred. Some academics have attracted extremely hostile 
reactions to their published views, including death threats and sustained efforts to have 
them removed from post. Dreger (op. cit. note 29) documents some of these. There are 
concerns that these sorts of reactions constitute intimidation and may suppress the 
expression or exploration of some controversial topics. In response consideration is being 
given to founding an academic journal (which will be rigorously peer-reviewed) that gives 
academics the option of publishing controversial pieces under a pseudonym (J. McMahan, F. 
Minerva & P. Singer. 2018 Setting the Record Straight on the Journal of Controversial Ideas. 
The Guardian 18 November. Available 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/18/setting-the-record-straight-on-the-
journal-of-controversial-ideas [Accessed 28 November 2018].
































































activism are, however, a deterrent to other forms of engagement or activism. Indeed, 
silencing any kind of opposition may be precisely their point. We may, therefore, need to 
differentiate between would–be activists who work for change quietly and more 
anonymously to avoid unwanted aggressive attention, and activists who would in principle 
be willing to be publically identified but who judge stealth to be the most effective means to 
achieve change.
Activism by stealth may fail to meet all of the components of activism given that activism as 
defined in this paper requires one to publically align one’s own views with a particular 
movement or call for change. Working behind the scenes seems to be the antithesis of 
activism in this respect. It may, however, nonetheless have the components of being 
motivated by partisan commitment and conducted with persistent, vigorous effort. 
Recognising activism by stealth as a separate category distinguishes on this typology 
between those who actively seek appointments to committees and policy–forming groups 
overtly intending to make change (as described above and in contrast to those who merely 
accept invitations to give evidence in such fora) and those ho may be equally active in 
seeking appointment as a vehicle for change by stealth.
7. VESTED–INTEREST ACTIVISM, RELUCTANT ACTIVISM AND IMPACT ENGAGEMENT
It is not uncommon for bioethics academics to write on areas where they have a vested–
interest or to reflect on the ethical dimensions of personal experience.33 Others, who may 
33 For example, T. Shakespeare. 2006. Disability Rights and Wrongs. Oxon, Routledge.  
































































or may not self–identify as working in bioethics, have been motivated to become activists 
for causes because of their personal experiences and publish in journals selected to 
influence bioethics debate.34 
Not all activists have a vested–interest in the causes they join and some bioethics academics 
are activists in areas completely unrelated to their areas of research interest – indeed they 
may have been activists quite independently of, and prior to embarking on, their current 
career path. In other words, even where they use their professional skills in their activism 
they do so as concerned citizens who happen to have those skills. So, for example, an 
academic best known for her work on reproductive ethics might be an activist for the 
preservation and promotion of bees. Likewise, some academics are committed trade 
unionists but whilst they may be activists at work, their activism relates to their position qua 
employee rather than qua bioethics academic. 
Vested–interest activists on the other hand, engage in bioethics research as part of their 
activism. Vested–interest activism can lead academics to research areas in which they are 
already activists, whether or not they are personally affected by the issues they choose to 
campaign on. This distinguishes them in this typology from those who do not conduct 
professional research in the areas in which they are activists. So, the bee-loving bioethics 
academic only becomes a vested-interest activist on this definition when she switches her 
34 For example, C. Kitzinger & J. Kitzinger. Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
from Minimally Conscious and Vegetative Patients: Family Perspectives. Journal of Medical 
Ethics. 2015: 41; 157–160.
































































professional research attention from reproductive ethics to the ethics of bee preservation 
and promotion. 
Vested–interest activism of this kind comes with benefits and draw-backs. Having shared 
experience and being active in a particular cause can open doors to being able to conduct 
research with participants who might otherwise be suspicious or hostile. This can greatly 
enhance the quality of the resulting research. One might also have the benefit of speaking 
with a different sort of authority: the authority of one who has ‘been there’ and to whose 
experience–informed views some weight needs to be given.35 One may also be open (rightly 
or wrongly) to criticisms of the kind described at the front of this paper; namely one’s 
academic research may be regarded as less than open–minded. Indeed, anyone who is an 
identifiable activist and who is publishing in the same area might be open (again, rightly or 
wrongly) to the reaction of ‘you would say that wouldn’t you’. This reaction might be 
sufficient for some academics to avoid activism: they may feel that their research will have 
more traction if they are not personally linked to the causes that might useful employ their 
findings or arguments. Undoubtedly, though, vested–interests have produced excellent 
research in bioethics and those with vested–interests working in bioethics have been 
effective champions for change.
35 Whilst personal experience gives weight, it might not be decisive: the experience of 
others might be different and even similar or shared experiences can result in people 
holding contrary views. Experience should not be denied, but neither should it function as a 
trump card in academic debate.
































































Vested–interest activism is differently motivated to what for the purposes of this paper I 
describe as ‘reluctant action’ by minorities. In many organisations, academia included, 
obvious or self–declared members of minority groups may find themselves drawn into 
supporting others belonging to the same groups, or being asked to be (sometimes token) 
members of institutional committees. ‘Reluctant’ here is being contrasted with ‘vested–
interest’ because action in this area may not be something that the academic concerned 
considers a priority in either her professional or personal life. This may be a for a variety 
reasons: just not being interested in action of this kind, or objections to tokenism, or 
resentment at being saddled with additional responsibilities (seemingly just because one is a 
member of a minority group), which may not receive much in the way of institutional 
recognition when it comes to promotion or securing tenure. Those acting reluctantly may be 
nonetheless very effective and persistent agents for change, conscientiously devoting time 
and energy to the task, thereby moving closer to activism. Others may feel that they ought 
to offer a helping hand, particularly to junior faculty, or to act in solidarity with colleagues, 
just because they have experienced similar difficulties; but may not do so openly or 
consistently. Some may feel that they need to describe or speak out about their difficulties 
either to call attention to them or to bolster their own support mechanisms. Here 
engagement has nothing to do with one’s research interests even if the actions take place in 
the work environment. 
Both vested–interest activism and reluctant activism contrast with engagement designed to 
meet institutional targets and preoccupations such as the UK REF. Here, research for 
activism – such as that conducted by vested–interest researchers – contrasts with actively 
engaging with stakeholders for research purposes. In the latter case, the researcher forges 
































































relationships with, for example, specific patient groups or NGOs and activists representing 
their interests, in order to improve the quality of her research, the outcome of which may or 
may not align with the stakeholders’ interests as they perceive them.36 This paper started 
with the observation that research in the UK is being shaped by what has been dubbed the 
‘impact agenda’ and the related PPI agenda. Undoubtedly academics of all kinds are working 
more closely with stakeholders and in ways that gives more weight to the latter’s interests 
as they define them. The motivations for doing so may, however, be mixed – both at the 
level of populations and individuals. Engaging with stakeholders as a means of further one’s 
own research career and reputation falls short of activism where self–interest rather than 
the good of others is the primary motivation. Engaging directly with stakeholders and taking 
36 There are some grey lines here. Research findings may add evidence that can be used to 
effect change for the better. However, the results may disappoint collaborators hoping for 
change if the evidence produced points in a different direction. Unlike research for activism, 
the researcher is not partisan; she will start from a position of equipoise and will judge the 
research to be successful if it is methodologically robust, whatever the results are. In this 
respect, the good towards which the research is aimed is better understanding. This does 
not imply that research for activism will necessarily produce biased research results, but the 
research effort will be focussed on producing evidence for a particular kind of change. 
Results that do not support this change might be regarded as disappointing in this context. 
Dreger (see note 29) recalls stating quite explicitly that she was willing to accept reliable 
evidence, whatever it shows, in her own activism for intersex children, and is critical of 
activists who reject out of hand results that do not conform to their view of how the world 
is/should be. 
































































one’s research questions and findings directly to them is, nonetheless, likely to be beneficial 
to all parties. Good quality evidence can be vital in determining what practices and policies 
ought to be. At the same time, being very active in ensuring that the results of one’s 
research are implemented because this is required for REF or because one is bowing to 
pressures from one’s employing institution to raise its research profile, lacks the quality of 
being partisan that is required for activism.
8. ACKNOWLEDGING GROSS WRONG–DOING AND ETHICAL VIOLATIONS
Wendy Rogers has written about her reaction to being confronted with evidence of the 
systematic murder for their organs of Falun Gong practitioners in China:
I felt fairly stunned after the film [Hard to Believe37]: if I was an ‘expert’ in the ethics of 
organ donation, why didn’t I know about this?38
The scale of this atrocity is difficult to calculate, and should not be confused with the 
controversial removal of organs from Chinese prisoners immediately following their 
execution for capital offices. Ethan Gutmann estimated a range of between 9,000 and 
37 K. Stone. (2015). Hard to Believe. Swoop Films. Retrieved on 8 Feb 2018, from 
http://www.hardtobelievemovie.com/ (reference as originally cited in Roger’s paper)
38 W.A. Rogers. Bioethics and Activism: a Natural Fit? Bioethics (forthcoming)
































































120,000 murders of Falun Gong for their organs between 2000-200839. In an update to their 
combined work in this area, Gutmann, David Mattas and David Kilgour concluded that their 
‘original estimates were far too low’. 40 
There is general, international support for the dead donor rule41. Technical disagreements 
over what it means to be dead for the purposes of organ removal abound, however.42 There 
are also disagreements about whether, and if so under what circumstances, convicted 
prisoners sentenced to death may be considered suitable donors in countries that use the 
death penalty.43 Some prohibitions, however, seem so axiomatic that they do not warrant 
careful exposition in academic journals: not murdering people for their organs is one such. 
The bioethics academic is not able to respond to such atrocities by publishing a tightly 
argued paper enlightening the reader about the wrongness of the policy because academic 
39 E. Gutmann. 2014. The Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China’s Secret 
Solution to Its Dissident Problem. New York, Prometheus Books
40 D. Kilgour, D. Mattias & E. Guthmann. Bloody Harvest/The Slaughter: an Update April 30, 
2017: 13. Available https://endtransplantabuse.org/an-update/ [accessed 3 April 2018].
41 This stipulates that donors must be dead before vital organs are removed for 
transplantation (and that the removal of organs should not contribute to, or hasten, death). 
Some countries permit living donation of a single kidney or liver or lung lobe.
42 See for instance, M. Nair-Collins & F.G. Miller. Do the ‘Brain Dead’ Merely Appear to be 
Alive? Journal of Medical Ethics 2017: 43; 747-753.
43 See for instance, A. Caplan. The Use of Prisoners as Sources of Organs: an Ethically 
Dubious Practice. American Journal of Bioethics. 2011: 10; 1-5.
































































journals expect original contributions not statements of the obvious. In the case of China 
and the Falun Gong (and other prisoners of conscience, and including, more recently, 
concerns that the Uyghur community is next to be targeted), what is required is carefully 
documented evidence that the practice is continuing.44 But ensuring that the evidence is 
taken seriously by everyone involved in transplant (including potential recipients traveling 
for organs) requires persistent, informed and articulate persuasion outside academia: 
activism, in other words. 
What I am interested to try to capture here is a particular spur for bioethics academics to 
engage in activism: the ‘why did I not know about this?’ reaction to being unexpectedly 
confronted by systematic and colossal wrong–doing in one’s own area of research expertise. 
It is a kind of professional shame that mirrors the personal horror, and demands action.
Recent revelations of sexual exploitation in the aid community might prove to be another 
such example. Sexual exploitation and harassment is currently receiving much attention and 
its endemic proportions are being exposed, including, at the time of writing (April 2018), 
within aid organisations.45 Academics working in disaster bioethics are familiar with the 
44 For example, W.A. Rogers, T. Trey, Fiatarone Singh, M. et al. Smoke and Mirrors: 
Unanswered Questions and Misleading Statements Obscure the Truth about Organ Sources 
in China. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2016: 42; 552–553. 
45 J. Gillespie, C. Wheeler, I. Ramzan & R. Kerbaj. 2018. Oxfam among Charities Reeling as 
120 Workers Accused of Sexual Abuse in Last Year Alone. The Sunday Times 11 February. 
































































particular dangers for women and girls in the aftermath of conflict and disaster; also with 
the practical and ethical difficulties responders and agencies face in ensuring that effective 
healthcare is delivered, by competent practitioners without eroding and undermining local 
services. These are the serious but ‘bread and butter’ issues tackled in the literature. But 
claims that aid workers themselves are known to be engaging in predatory sexual activities 
targeting the vulnerable population they are meant to serve, is also stunning. Worse is the 
suggestion that, along with all of the other compromises for the greater good seen in 
disaster responses, the: 
 
Sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls has been ignored; it’s been known 
about and ignored for seven years. … Somewhere there has been a decision made that 
it is OK for women’s bodies to continue to be used, abused and violated, in order for 
aid to be delivered for a larger group of people.46
Where this example differs from that of systematic killing for organs in China is that it does 
invite a careful ethical exposition of the apparently accepted trade–off between protecting 
women from sexual violation and ensuring the aid supply chain for the greater good. Like 
the carefully complied evidence of transplant activity in China, an academic contribution of 
this kind would bolster activism activities. It is fair to presume that all academics working in 
bioethics think that their chosen area is important to some extent. Many of us may, 
however, have fallen into these areas through a combination of fortune and circumstance 
Available https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/charities-reel-as-120-workers-accused-
ofsexual-abuse-in-last-year-alone-tcqcm8zb2 [Accessed 28 November 2018]
46 Danielle Spencer, speaking on Today programme, BBC Radio 4. 27 February 2018
































































rather than as a result of a considered judgement about where our talents could make the 
most impact. Perhaps more consideration should be given to the targeting of talents, as 
suggested by the Dalhousie Impact Ethics team. Either way, when ethical violations are 
uncovered in one’s area of expertise, there is surely a professional obligation to respond to 
these even if this does not translate into an obligation to follow–though with the activism 
activities that will translate the carefully crafted philosophical arguments into social change. 
9. CONCLUSION
There are a variety of ways in which academics working in bioethics can be involved in 
engagement activities that fall short of activism, and others that can be described as 
activism. I have offered a taxonomy of activities that range from the publication of more 
theoretical applied ethics to extreme activism, and which excludes some activities such as 
those unrelated to one’s professional research (for instance, union activities). This can be 
presented in the following way:
<insert figure 1 here>
There are reasons why public engagement of all kinds can be regarded as ‘part of the job’, 
fruitful for academic research and rewarding in terms of contributing to beneficial (from the 
point of view of the academic concerned) changes in human behaviour, processes, 
institutions or environments (or combinations of all of these). There are also reasons to be 
sceptical about research that seems to be partisan. There are personal and professional 
risks, as well as rewards, to activism. 
































































My original intention had been to write a piece for this special collection on whether 
bioethics academics ought to be involved in activism. It became apparent, however, that 
this depended on how activism in bioethics was to be defined. I have offered a definition of 
activism that distinguishes it from other forms of public engagement that academics might 
increasing be involved in, which included being partisan, and being personally and publicly 
involved in activities aimed at bringing about change. As activism engages individuals 
personally (as well as or even instead of) professionally, the degree to which a bioethics 
academic ought to be an activist in areas in which she publishes is probably going to be a 
personal decision, as well as one that depends on the kinds of research she does. Activism is 
time–consuming and the desire to strike a balance between work and non–work activities a 
legitimate one. Being an activist in areas unrelated to one’s work interests is one way of 
striking this balance. Recognising the demands of time and energy in one’s non–work life is 
also a legitimate reason for resisting activism of any kind. 
The degree to which one should be aiming to maximise the impact of one’s research, and 
active in achieving this aim, is a different question but with its own normative elements. 
Drivers such as the REF, contractual agreements made with funders and employers' 
expectations are likely to be influential. There are good moral as well as prudential reasons 
for ensuring that research is excellent, relevant and effective.
Since activism by definition requires personal effort and resources, it may be incompatible 
with academic employment to be an extreme activist where ‘extreme’ refers to time rather 
than methods. It may also seem incompatible with ideals of academia for academics to use 
falsehood and ad hominem attacks in their activism. 
































































Impact Ethics as described by the Dalhousie team serves as a reminder that we are to some 
extent free to consider what our research priorities ought to be. Evidence of horrific, 
systematic and wholesale wrong–doing ought, however, to provoke some response from 
the academic bioethics community already working in those areas.
































































Figure 1 Taxonomy of activities from ‘pure’ philosophy to extreme vested interest activism.


































































Writing for the general public in plain EnglishAccepting invitations to give evidence based on existing publications
Being philosopher–coach or facilitator on 
a public bodyPublic dissemination activities in fulfilment of e.g. funding contracts
PPI–type activities to shape future 
research
Ethics consultant-mediator
High profile academic responses to ethical 





Soliciting places on influential bodies to effect  
broader changeVested–int est activism
Extreme vested–interest activism 
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activism
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